Journal of the Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics
Volume 2

Article 7

1-1-1999

Questions and Answers on Lloyd Weinreb's and
Mary Daly's Articles

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jisle
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
Recommended Citation
(1999) "Questions and Answers on Lloyd Weinreb's and Mary Daly's Articles," Journal of the Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics: Vol. 2
, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jisle/vol2/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the
Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON LLOYD
WEINREB'S AND MARY DALY'S ARTICLES
Hi, my name is Kathleen Clark. I just wanted to ask
Professor Weinreb about his last comment, to make sure that I understood it. You said that we should look skeptically on any system where
there is a wide separation between ethics, generally, and professional ethics. Did I understand you correctly?
QUESTIONER #1:

LLOYD L. WEINREB:

Yes

QUESTIONER #1: And you then would look skeptically on any system of
role-differentiated ethics by that same standard.
LLOYD L. WEINREB: I don't know how generally you would like for me
to respond. I will respond as generally as your latter question. Yes, my
general impression, which is not confined to the legal profession, is that
so-called professional ethics are a means of helping practitioners in that
profession to justify a role that, in some respects, is violative of ordinary
ethics. I believe very strongly that if one looked closely at the justifications for those special professional ethics, one would find that the justifications would serve the profession more than they serve the objectives
which the process is intended to serve.

Okay, let me just (for what it's worth) throw out an idea
there. I think there have been some very cogent defenses of role-differentiated effects. There is a book from about 1980 on Professional Ethics
by someone named Goldman; I believe he's a philosopher, not a lawyer
or anything. But for what it's worth, I think there are out there in the
literature strong defenses of the role differentiation that you are skeptical
about.
LLOYD L. WEINREB: Yes, I am not unaware of those books. I happen to
disagree with them quite generally. But I do think it's fair to say that the
kind of comment I just made, and I think also the kind of comment you
just made, can't really be tested except concretely and in detail. So one
would have to ask about a particular practice in its concrete context.
QUESTIONER #1:

QUESTIONER

#1: Good enough.

QUESTIONER

#2: It would seem to me that the proof in the pudding is in

the tasting, so to speak, and I would be interested in the comparative

outcomes analysis. First of all, our system is so often called the adver-
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sary system, referring to the exceptional method of processing criminal
defendants. The real method is to induce self-incrimination by offering
the prospect of prolonged incarceration. If you don't, presumably that
might cause people to self-incriminate who didn't even do it. Is there any
empirical evidence that the adversary system works better than, or worse
than, the magisterial system, and would it be possible to perform such
studies? I know that there has been one study that was published by the
Justice Department a couple of years ago looking at DNA evidence
which exonerated people who were convicted by the usual eyewitness
and forensic stuff, and showed that quite a few people were slipping into
jail through our adversary system, some of them even pleading guilty.
But I wonder if there has been any thought to a comparative study, and if
you would favor moving away from the adversary system, even if it
turned out empirically to do a better job of separating the sheep from the
goats?
The answer to the latter question is easy. No, if
another system would do a better job, let's use it.
LLOYD L. WEINREB:

#2: But you said that the adversary system had certain ethical issues for you in terms of professional ethics.
QUESTIONER

Let me try to practice what I preach and respond in
a little bit of detail. First, I think what you were saying at the outset was
that we have the privilege against self-incrimination and the other countries don't. That's simply not accurate as a concrete matter. In the
United States, although we protect the privilege against compulsory
incrimination, and against compulsory self-incrimination very strongly at
trial, there is no system in the world that puts as great pressure on a
defendant to acknowledge his guilt. That is simply the fact. In other
countries, although theoretically, you can be compelled to incriminate
yourself, the real risk is only that people will look adversarial; the judges
will look adversely at your refusal to speak. It is the case that if a witness simply insisted on not speaking that would be the end of the matter.
In this country, you can be put in jail, as we know from some recent
events, for refusing to testify against your father, your son, your sister, or
your brother, all of that. It startles me that we are so insistent on the
apparent virtues of our system and pay no attention to what happens in
the vast majority of cases. In the vast majority of cases the defendant
pleads guilty, subject to enormous pressure to do so. I don't know if
that's compulsory self-incrimination or not. Constitutionally, of course,
it's not. But as a practical matter, I don't understand why we talk only
about one side of it. Similarly, although we reject the dossier system that
LLOYD L. WEINREB:

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1999]

Professor Daly explains so well, the fact of the matter is that in the one
portion of the process that concerns most defendants, namely sentencing,
we have something very like the dossier system. We don't talk about
that; we talk about all this adversary process. It's bologna in a very large
majority of the cases.

#3: Can I come up?

QUESTIONER
PROFESSOR

DALY: Absolutely, step up.

#3: I'm Steve Pepper from the University of Denver. I just
wanted to follow up on Kathleen Clark's question about ordinary morality versus roles and specific morality. I am curious as to whether you
think there ought to be confidentiality in regard to physicians and lawyers, and if you do, whether you think that's role-differentiated morality
or just a specific application of ordinary morality?
QUESTIONER

L. WEINREB: I do think there should be confidentiality because I
think the lawyer's role is very, very important. I wasn't suggesting with
Shakespeare that first we kill all the lawyers. That is role differentiation.
I wasn't intending to suggest that there is no appropriate role differentiation or that there aren't professional roles. As I said, I think one has to
ask in each case whether that particular aspect of the profession is one
that serves us well.
LLOYD

#2: You have been criticizing the adversarial model in the
criminal justice system. My question is a little bit broader. I think that
the adversarial role of the lawyer in legal ethics pollutes other areas of
practice which have nothing to do with criminal justice, like corporate
and securities law. You've also been talking about the differences
between reality and rhetorical flourishes or justifications for the position.
Do you believe that the model rules are a significant advancement from
the model code in terms of looking at more than just an adversarial system? Or do you think it's really a matter of just window dressing to talk
about roles other than the adversarial one but then truncate them so completely that it remains just as adversarial.
QUESTIONER

LLOYD

L.

WEINREB:

QUESTIONER

Model Rules now?

#2: As opposed to Model Code.

L. WEINREB: I think that what the Model Rules Code of Ethics
mostly do is to permit a lawyer not to have to answer, in each case or
many times within a case, exceedingly difficult questions. Do I try to
make this witness look bad when I know that what she's testifying to is
the truth? That's a very difficult question, if you are committed, and I'll
LLOYD

78

JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 2:75

put in parenthesis (paid by the other side). Those questions come up
over and over and over. I think the Canons of Ethics and Model Rules
and so forth permit a lawyer not to confront those questions.
#4: My question concerns the difference between the criminal and civil models in the United States. It is somewhat curious to me,
Professor Weinreb, that you chose the criminal model to use as an attack
(I don't know whether that's overstating it) on the adversarial nature of
the process. So I have two questions. First, do you see a distinction
between the criminal and the civil model in the United States in terms of
the adversarial nature in the proceeding? Is it easier to make the case
that you are attempting to make by using the civil model? The second
one is this. In France, as Mary Daly put it, the standards are that once
you get to trial in those few cases, it is preponderance of the evidence.
Yet in the United States, it's proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And if
we are going to adhere to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard,
how do you exercise that standard, test that standard, if it's not by vigorous advocacy, given the fact that the standard is so high? And if the state
has to prove its case by that amount of evidence, is it not the obligation
of the defense lawyer to ensure that the state is put to that proof as Justice Wright said in Roe v. Wade, and in his other Supreme Court cases
and elsewhere?
QUESTIONER

LLOYD

L.

WEINREB:

I didn't choose the criminal process; the organizers

of the conference did. That's what I was asked to talk about. I could talk
about the civil process but with not nearly so much conviction. For that I
would turn to my friend, David Wilkins. I'm just much more familiar
with the criminal process. I certainly would not abandon the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for all sorts of reasons that we all
understand. We don't want to convict someone who is even possibly not
guilty. I wasn't suggesting that we eliminate advocacy; I don't want to
say "let's kill or abandon all the lawyers." Reserving the advocacy role
of a lawyer does not entail all of the other attributes of adversariness, for
example, lawyers selecting the jurors. Simply do away with lawyers
roaming around the courtroom as if it is a stadium. Tell them to sit
down; that would accomplish a lot. Everyone else has to stay seated; try
telling the lawyers to stay seated and so-forth. I would reserve for the
lawyers the right to argue, to take the evidence, pull it together, and make
an argument. That's different from choosing which witnesses to present.
Choosing the order in which to present them. But all of this is exceedingly difficult because one can't do all this without something of the
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dossier that Professor Daly spoke of. So I would talk about details rather
than a global change.
#4: Can I just ask you one further question? I note, of
course, that Monroe isn't here with us this afternoon. As a former criminal defense lawyer, I wonder how I could possibly test the prosecution's
case beyond a reasonable doubt if I can't call the witnesses that I choose
to call and ask them the questions that I choose to ask them? I would
note also that in most jurisdictions in the United States trial judges currently have the power to question witnesses and do so. It's a matter of
their discretion and that at least in many jurisdictions, including California, jurors with the judge's permission currently have the power to ask
questions. In some California courts they do. So given that, why change
the role of the advocate by limiting his or her ability to present the evidence in a way which truly tests the strength of the prosecution's case?
QUESTIONER

LLOYD L. WEINREB: Insofar as it does, I'd keep it. We talked about
jurors and judges asking questions. We all know that they do that very
seldom. Most judges get to the bench having been lawyers. They respect
the lawyer's role. Their is no special magisterial training in this country.
Jurors who ask questions are not loved by anyone in the courtroom, but
that role ought to be developed. I won't give you a resting place. I don't
see why only a lawyer is capable of testing a witness' testimony. I don't
see why someone who is not committed to twisting that witness' testimony toward a particular result is the only person who can ask a probing
question. It just doesn't seem so to me.

MARY DALY: I assume you anticipated being on the hot seat with
Monroe being on the panel. The most persuasive argument Monroe
makes, I believe, joined by Steve Pepper for the adversary system, is the
one grounded in human dignity. Using the idea of the example you gave,
cross-examining the truthful witness with the intention, clear intention of
conveying an impression that the testimony is false. To me it is consistent with common morality. The lawyer has been entrusted in the criminal proceeding with a tremendously personal and important aspect of the
defendant's personality as well as their future freedom and, in my State
of Texas, their life on occasion. Therefore, common morality it seems to
me, would in fact impose upon me the obligation to act on behalf of that
client in the way that the client would direct me to act. That's what I see
the professional rules doing. Where there are questions that are deeply
disputed or contested, that common morality would allow that person
who will bear the burden of the decision most commonly to, in fact,
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direct the action. That's what the lawyers' ethics codes do. Do you dispute that?
L. WEINREB: I do dispute it on both counts. First, that our system preserves the defendant's dignity and, second, that common morality
indicates that a lawyer should do what lawyers do. What common
morality requires is that no person be convicted unless that person is
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not require that someone be in the courtroom trying to distort truth, questioning yes, but not
deliberately distorting it. It's a fair question to what extent can a neutral
official serve the objective that a defense counsel serves? I don't think a
neutral official can serve it entirely, and so I would reserve the role of
defense counsel. In some respects this is as you describe it. But let me
address the matter of human dignity because I quite disagree that our
process protects the defendant's dignity. In our process the defendant is
a thing required to sit there silently, and not speak. If she becomes angry
and interrupts, the judge will say sit down. If she speaks again the judge
will say "quiet or you'll be taken out. If you want to speak, you can
speak as the witness." We deny the defendant any dignity as a person.
The person is there to be identified, to be spoken about as a thing. If you
saw the defendant in a French trial, you would understand what it is to
assert yourself as an individual, that we deny in our trial.
LLOYD

#5: I just wanted to comment on treating the defendant as a
thing. It happened that I was in the court room in Judge Julius Hoffman's
court when Bobby Seal was carried into the courtroom bound and
gagged, tied to a chair, (speaking as if he was gagged, not distinctly).
The judge said, "Mr. Seal if you don't stop misbehaving in this court
room you will soon be ejected." It was the ultimate thingness of a
defendant; it was a shocking thing to see.
QUESTIONER

L. WEIJREB: But it happens in all trials. What dignity is there in
sitting there being spoken about, unable to speak? The only time we give
the defendant an opportunity to speak is at allocation which is supposed
to be his opportunity to speak for himself at sentencing. By then, of
course, it's too late. Even the sentence has been decided. So it's just an
altogether phony opportunity to assert yourself as an individual.
LLOYD

#5: But isn't the constitutional protection in the criminal
proceeding to confront witnesses as well as to testify or decline to testify
and the protection of not being forced to testify except through a lawyer
in a highly formalized and complicated system where you can compromise important legal points and political rights by misstep. Is that not
affirmation of dignity?
QUESTIONER
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LLOYD L. WEINREB: I am not questioning the defendant's right to

remain silent. I never said anything to suggest that he is required to
speak. If she wants to be silent, of course, she should. That's her role,
but that is being converted into preventing her from speaking, which
seems to be quite a different matter.
Roy SIMON: This will have to be our last question and then we will

move directly on to our final program.
#6: I first have to plead guilty for engaging my whole life in
obfuscation and twisting and parading around a courtroom. It took me a
little time to recover from the onslaught. I am not sure I agree that that is
the process in which we engage. I actually take great offense at what I
consider to be sort of a smear of all trial lawyers because I don't think
that is what we do. I do think that you're wrong about one critical
aspect. No neutral will dedicate the time and effort that we lawyers dedicate to developing a case. The time that lawyers dedicate to thinking
about a case is entirely different. We may or may not get a neutral who
does that, but with a lawyer at least we have some assurance, given
enough resources, of course, to do that. But the thing that troubles me
the most about your presentation is the thing I think we deliver the best.
My clients don't want to participate. They want me to participate. You
may think that that's giving me an opportunity to be the great gladiator,
and maybe something in the air convinces them of that. But almost without exception, my clients are very happy; the less they get to participate,
the happier they are. They are not looking for an opportunity to show
their stuff. They are looking for me to stand between them and whatever
the process is. Whether that's good or bad I don't know, but that's what
real clients are telling us everyday. Often we have to persuade them to
participate a lot more than they do. They are scared to death of this
process; it's intimidating for whatever reasons, many of which have
nothing to do with the fact that it's an adversary process. They want us to
do it, and that's the service that we lawyers provide. I don't think you've
answered that particular aspect of what is happening in real life. You
come to my office tomorrow or whenever I get back to work, and I will
sit down and we will go through with clients. You do an empirical study
of what clients want. They don't want to participate.
QUESTIONER

LLOYD L. WEINREB: I am sorry. Let me just say, I'm sorry if it seemed

like a smear or an undiluted attack. I didn't mean it to be that. But it
seems to me very difficult to make the arguments against what we take
for granted without making them pounding the table a little bit. It does
seem to me that all the difficulties of the adversary system you stated
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within parenthesis while you were making your argument, providing
there are enough funds, of course. Well, there aren't. There aren't
equally good lawyers for every case. We need to think about the dominance of the lawyers in that context, and so forth. Much of what you say
is, of course, true. The question is whether what's good and valuable
about the process requires what's not so good and not so valuable.
Roy SIMON: As an organizer of the conference, I note the difficult position into which we have cast Professor Weinreb. We promised him an
adversarial debate and, instead of appearing as a neutral, he appeared as
an advocate for the neutral system.
Yes, just say your name please.
#6: Thank you; my name is Doust, and I am a lawyer from
Vancouver, Canada. I have been a trial lawyer for both the prosecution
and defense for over 30 years. Professor, I sat here and listened, and it
strikes me that in our system of justice, you know we value the protection of innocent people to the point that, as I am sure you know, there is
an old maxim, "We'd rather let nine guilty go free than to convict one
innocent one." I rather like the proposition in the same terms that I like
to be able to put my head on the pillow every night in my country and
feel that if I am innocent I will never be convicted of having done something that I didn't do. And in that vein, my experience tells me that in
my over 30 years, there is no tool more effective for ferreting out the
truth than a well-prepared, intense, and I'll say, biased cross-examination
when a witness is lying. Now within the context of our system, it's
inconceivable to me that any objective individual could conduct a
lengthy cross-examination structured from a particular point of view,
designed to demonstrate that evidence ought not to be accepted even if
the witness at the end does not scream out, "Yes I'm lying; you demonstrate the falsity of it." It takes time; it takes considerable effort, and it
takes a perspective. Now, having said that, I will concede that I have on
occasion seen lawyers try to obfuscate in the sense of taking a witness
whose evidence they may believe to be true. One wonders how you (as
you put it) know it's the truth because, frankly, I don't know whether we
get into deciding whether it's true or not. But even if that does happen
from time to time in the context of the adversarial system, I, for my part,
accept that there are certain flaws in the system. I accept that we do have
to live to a degree with problems of that type within the context of a
system that recognizes that we are not going to achieve perfect justice.
We are never going to achieve trust at all costs. We are, after all, as I said
at the outset, trying to ensure a reasonable degree of order by ensuring
QUESTIONER
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that we will convict those who are guilty as often as we can. But not at
the cost of convicting any that are innocent. So we accept that some of
the flaws you refer to exist. Finally, I want to say that I frequently compare our system and the English system, to which we are much closer
than you are, I think, to the American system. Our judges won't let us
wander around. Our picking of a jury consists of knowing their name
and their address and deciding instantly, having gotten that information
that morning whether we accept or reject those witnesses. Some of the
flaws to which you make reference, it seems to me, are merely cosmetic.
The more fundamental attack you make, I think, is on the proposition
that the adversary system doesn't always work. Nobody says it does.
LLOYD

L.

WEINREB:

MARY DALY: Thank

I think you have to keep the goal in mind.
you.

L. WEINREB: Let me just go back to what I said at the beginning.
There aren't two systems, an adversary system and an inquisitorial system. I quite agree with you. I quite agree that there is much about the
process of adversarial questioning, and so forth, that's good. You mentioned for example having a voir dire that doesn't involve our endless
game playing by lawyers psyching out the jurors. You are quite right.
That's exactly the sort of improvement that we ought to have. We ought
to adopt your procedure in that respect. It seems to me that it is, as I
said, at the beginning, the question of looking at each of our particular
procedures and deciding which is worth preserving and which is not.
You are much closer to what I think we would end up with than we are
ourselves.
LLOYD

QUESTIONER
LLOYD

L.

#6: But we are adversaries.

WEINREB:

I am not opposing the adversary process.

Roy SIMON: I congratulate Mary Daly and Professor Weinreb on a program that drew comments from about 20% of the audience. So we will
move directly on to our next program. If I could invite Tony Kronman,
Amy Mashburn, Judge Walker, and Burnele Powell up to the podium, we
will move on directly.

